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We present a simple model of systemic risk and show how each ﬁ  nancial insti-
tution’s contribution to systemic risk can be measured and priced. An institu-
tion’s contribution, denoted systemic expected shortfall (SES), is its propensity 
to be undercapitalized when the system as a whole is undercapitalized, which 
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nancial institutions can impose an externality on the rest of the economy,
and the recent crisis provides ample evidence of the importance of containing this risk.
However, current nancial regulations, such as Basel I and Basel II, are designed to limit
each institution's risk (for example, market and credit value-at-risk) seen in isolation; they
are not suciently focused on systemic risk. This is in spite of the fact that systemic risk
is often the rationale provided for such regulation. As a result, while individual risks are
properly dealt with in normal times, the system itself remains, or in some cases is induced
to be, fragile and vulnerable to large macroeconomic shocks.1
Our goal in this paper is to propose a simple, alternative measure that focuses on systemic
risk. To this end, we rst develop a framework for formalizing and then measuring systemic
risk. Second, given this framework, we formulate an optimal policy for managing systemic
risk. Finally, we provide a detailed empirical analysis of the nancial crisis of 2007-2009,
giving support to our theoretical analysis of systemic risk.
It is important to recognize that value-at-risk (VaR), the dominant form of risk measure-
ment in the nancial sector, was invented by banks as an internal risk management tool.
VaR was meant to be useful for comparing risk across desks and asset classes within a bank.
VaR was never meant to be a tool for regulating banks. The need for economic foundations
for a systemic risk measure is more than an academic concern. We believe that lack of such
a measure is at the root of practical failures of regulation.
It is of course dicult, if not impossible, to nd a systemic risk measure that is at
the same time practically relevant and completely justied by a general equilibrium model.
The reason is that nancial regulation can only be analyzed in economies with incomplete
markets, moral hazard and information asymmetries. The problem, however, is that to date
the gap between the theoretical recommendations and the practical needs of regulators has
been so wide that measures such as institution-level VaR have persisted in assessing risks of
the nancial system as a whole.
1See Crockett (2000) and Acharya (2001) for an early recognition of this inherent tension between micro-
prudential and macro-prudential regulation of the nancial sector.
3Our strategy is to study a simplied theoretical model that is based on the common
denominator of various models. We argue that two ideas are widely shared by economists
and regulators. The rst idea is that the main reason for regulating nancial institutions
is that there are externalities from their failures (or even just under-capitalization) that
spill over to the rest of the economy. The second idea is that if these externalities are
not internalized by nancial institutions, then they manifest as excessive risk, leverage and
herding in business and trading decisions of nancial rms.
Given these two basic ideas, the critical step is to model the externalities. This is where
we depart from the fully micro-founded models and instead use the stress tests of the spring of
2009 as a guide to learn about the type of externality that regulators and market participants
seem to view as a rst-order concern. Specically, we assume that the externality depends
on the aggregate capital shortfall in the nancial industry.2 We then study the eect of
externality on risk choices of banks that maximize shareholder value given limited liability.
The interesting point is that even such a simple model is enough to obtain a new and
interesting theory of systemic risk regulation.3
A detailed description of the theoretical and empirical results follows.
Theoretical results: Our theory considers a number of nancial institutions (\banks")
that must decide on how much capital to raise and which risk prole to choose in order to
maximize their risk-adjusted return. A regulator considers the aggregate outcome of banks'
actions, additionally taking into account each banks losses during an idiosyncratic bank
failure and the externality arising in a systemic crisis, that is, when the aggregate capital
2This assumption is consistent with models that spell out the exact nature of the externality, such as
models of (i) nancial contagion through interconnectedness (e.g., Rochet and Tirole, 1996); (ii) pecuniary
externalities through re sales (e.g., several contributions compiled in Allen and Gale, 2007, and Acharya
and Yorulmazer, 2007), margin requirements (e.g., Garleanu and Pedersen, 2007), liquidity spirals (e.g.,
Brunneremeier and Pedersen, 2009), and interest rates (e.g., Diamond and Rajan, 2005 and Acharya, 2009);
and, (iii) runs (e.g., Diamond and Dybvig, 1983, and Pedersen, 2009).
3Our modeling nds natural parallels in the early work of Stigler (1971) and Peltzman (1976) on the
theory of regulation in the presence of externalities.
4in the banking sector is suciently low.4 The pure market-based outcome diers from the
regulator's preferred allocations since, due to limited liability, banks do not take into account
the loss they impose in default on creditors and the externality they impose on the society
at large in a systemic crisis.
We show that to align incentives, the regulator optimally imposes a tax on each bank
which is related to the sum of its expected default losses and its expected contribution to
a systemic crisis, denoted Systemic Expected Shortfall (SES). Importantly, this means that
banks have an incentive to reduce their tax (or insurance) payments and thus take into
account the externalities arising from their risks and default. Additionally, it means that
they pay in advance for any support given to the nancial system ex post during a systemic
crisis.
We show that SES, the systemic-risk component, is equal to the expected systemic costs
when the nancial sector becomes undercapitalized times the nancial institution's percent-
age contribution to this under-capitalization. SES is therefore measurable and we provide
theoretical justication for it being related to a nancial rms marginal expected shortfall,
MES (i.e., its losses in the tail of the aggregate sector's loss distribution), and to its leverage.
Empirical results: We empirically investigate three examples of emerging systemic risk in
the nancial crisis (focusing on large nancial institutions based in the United States) and
analyze the ability of our theoretically motivated measures to capture this risk. Specically,
we look at the relation between our measures and (i) capital shortfalls at large nancial
institutions estimated via stress tests performed by bank regulators during the Spring of
2009, (ii) realized systemic risk that emerged in the equity of large nancial rms from July
2007 through the end of 2008, and (ii) realized systemic risk that emerged in the credit
default swaps (cds) of large nancial rms from July 2007 through the end of 2008.
Figures 1, 2 and 5 provide a simple illustration of the ability of the rm's MES to forecast
realized systemic risk. In particular, the gures graph a cross-sectional scatter plot of the
4In the spirit of deposit insurance, we assume that part of the bank's liabilities are insured, but our results
extend more generally to no or full insurance.
5largest nancial rm's capital shortfalls (from the stress test exercise), realized equity returns
and realized cds returns during the nancial crisis respectively on each rm's MES prior to
the crisis. Each gure shows a clear relation between MES and systemic risk. Formal
statistical analysis shows that the slope is statistically signicant, and along with leverage,
MES loads signicantly on the nancial rms that ran aground during the crisis.
To mention one of the examples, we estimate our systemic risk measures for 102 nancial
rms in the US nancial sector with equity market capitalization as of end of June 2007
in excess of 5bln USD (see Appendix B). We calculate the MES of each rm using the
worst 5% days of the value-weighted market return from CRSP during the period June 2006
to June 2007, and leverage measured as of end of June 2007. To consider our measure's
ability to estimate each nancial institution's systemic risk taking, we check how well these
risk measures calculated before the sub-prime crisis help predict which institutions fared the
worst during the crisis period of July 2007 till December 2008. We nd that both components
of systemic risk MES and leverage contribute to explaining a signicant proportion of
the realized returns during the crisis (R2 of 27.34%). Importantly, standard measures of
institution-level risk such as expected loss in institution's own left tail and volatility do a
relatively poor job, and the standard measure of covariance, beta, has a modest explanatory
power.
To summarize, our theoretical analysis provides a conceptual framework for measuring a
nancial institution's contribution to systemic risk, specically as the losses it incurs when
the system as a whole is under-capitalized. Our empirical analysis shows that such a cross-
sectional measure of systemic risk can be estimated using market (equity and cds) data.
Importantly, the measure is able to predict realized systemic risk contributions of nancial
rms during the crisis of 2007-2009. These results have important consequences for design
of future regulation. One, they suggest that systemic risk measures such as ours may be
valuable aids to regulators when they \stress test" balance-sheets of individual institutions
to adverse macroeconomic and nancial conditions. Second, they imply that the extent to
which a rm is subject to macro-prudential regulation (say a tax, a capital requirement, or
6forced debt-for-equity conversion) can be tied to its market-based measures of systemic risk.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents a quick review of rm
level risk management. Section 2 lays out a model to dene, measure and manage systemic
risk. Section 3 discusses measurement issues associated with our systemic risk analysis.
Of particular interest, motivation is given for two variables in particular, namely the rm's
MES and leverage. Section 4 empirically analyzes the implications of our model for systemic
risk during the nancial crisis of 2007-2009. Section 5 relates our systemic risk measure to
existing literature and methodologies. Section 6 concludes.
1 A Review of Firm Risk Management
In this section we review the standard risk measures used inside nancial rms.5 This
review allows us to dene some simple concepts and intuitions that will be useful in our
model of systemic risk. Two standard measures of rm level risk are Value-at-Risk (VaR)
and Expected-Shortfall (ES). These seek to measure the potential loss incurred by the rm
as a whole in an extreme event. Specically, VaR is the most that the bank loses with
condence 1-, where  is typically taken to be 1% or 5%. For instance, with  = 5%, VaR
is the most that the bank loses with 95% condence. Hence, VaR =  q , where q is the
 quantile of the banks return R:
q = supfzjPr[R < r]  g (1)
The expected shortfall (ES) is the expected loss conditional on something bad happening,
that is, the loss conditional on the return being less than the a quantile:
ES =  E [RjR  q] (2)
Said dierently, the expected shortfall is the average returns on days when the portfolio
exceeds its VaR limit. We focus on ES because it is coherent and more robust than VaR.6
5See Yamai and Yoshiba (2005) for a fuller discussion.
6VaR can be gamed in the sense that asymmetric, yet very risky, bets may not produce a large VaR. The
reason is that if the negative payo is below the VaR 1% or 5% threshold, then VaR will not capture it.
7For risk management, transfer pricing, and strategic capital allocation, banks need to
break down rm-wide losses into contributions from individual groups or trading desks. To
see how, let us decompose the bank's return R into the sum of each group's return ri, that
is, R =
P
i yiri, where yi is the weight of group i in the total portfolio. From the denition




yiE [rijR  q]: (3)
From this expression we see the sensitivity of overall risk to exposure yi to each group i:
@ES
@yi
=  E [rijR  q]  MES
i
; (4)
where MESi is group i's marginal expected shortfall. The marginal expected shortfall mea-
sures how group i's risk taking adds to the bank's overall risk. In words, MES can be
measured by estimating group i's losses when the rm as a whole is doing poorly.
These standard risk-management practices can be useful for thinking about systemic
risk. A nancial system is constituted by a number of banks, just like a bank is constituted
by a number of groups. We can therefore consider the expected shortfall of the overall
banking system by letting R be the return of the aggregate banking sector. Then each
bank's contribution to this risk can be measured by its MES. We now present a model where
we model explicitly the nature of systemic externalities.
Indeed, one of the concerns in the ongoing crisis has been the failure of VaR to pick up potential \tail" losses
in the AAA-tranches. ES does not suer from this since it measures all the losses beyond the threshold.
This distinction is especially important when considering moral hazard of banks, because the large losses
because the VaR threshold are often born by the government bailout. In addition, VaR is not a coherent
measure of risk because the VaR of the sum of two portfolios can be higher than the sum of their individual
VaRs, which cannot happen with ES (Artzner et al., 1999).
82 Measuring Systemic Risk in an Economic Model
2.1 Banks' Incentives
The economy has N nancial rms, which we denote as banks for short, indexed by i = 1;::N
and two time periods t = 0;1. Each bank i chooses how much xi
s to invest in each of the








These investments can be nanced with debt or equity. In particular, the owner of any bank
i has an initial endowment  wi
0 of which wi
0 is kept in the bank as equity capital and the rest
is consumed or used for other activities. The bank can also raise debt bi. Naturally the sum
of the assets ai must equal the sum of the liabilities, equity wi







At time 1, asset s pays o ri
s per dollar invested for bank i (so the net return is ri
s  1). We
allow asset returns to be bank-specic to capture dierences in investment opportunities.
The total income of the bank at time 1 is yi = ^ yi i where i captures the costs of nancial



















Our formulation of distress costs is quite general. Distress costs can occur even if the rm
does not actually default. This specication captures debt overhang problems as well as
traditional costs of nancial distress. We restrict the specication to   ^ y so that y  0.
9To capture various types of government guarantees, we assume that a fraction i of the
debt is implicitly or explicitly guaranteed by the government. The face value of the debt is
















Although our focus is on systemic risk, we include government debt guarantees because
they are economically important and because we want to highlight the dierent regulatory
implications of deposit insurance and systemic risk. The insured debt can be interpreted
as deposits, but it can also cover implicit guarantees. Technically, the pricing equation (9)
treats the debt as homogeneous ex-ante with a fraction being guaranteed ex-post. This
is only for simplicity and all of our results go through if we make the distinction between
guaranteed and non-guaranteed debt ex-ante. (In that case, the guaranteed debt that the
bank can issue would be priced at face value, while the remaining debt would be priced as
above with  = 0.)
The net worth of the bank wi
1 at time 1 is
w
i




The owner of the bank equity is protected by limited liability so it receives (1   Ii)wi
1, where
Ii is the indicator of default by bank i:
Ii  1[wi
1<0]: (11)






















subject to (6){(10). Here, ui (:) is the bank owner's utility of time-1 income,  wi
0   wi
0   i
is the part of the initial endowment  wi
0 that is consumed immediately (or used for outside
activities). The remaining endowment is kept as equity capital wi
0 and or used to pay the
bank's tax i, which we describe later.
10The parameter c has several interpretations. I can simply be seen as a measure the utility
of immediate consumption, but, more broadly, it is the opportunity cost of equity capital.
We can think of the owner as raising capital at cost c, we can think of debt as providing
advantages in terms of taxes or incentives to work hard. What really matters for us is that
there is an opportunity cost of using capital instead of debt.
2.2 Welfare, Externalities, and the Planer's Problem









































This welfare function has three parts. The rst part is the sum of the utilities of all the
bank owners. The second part is the cost of the debt insurance program. The parameter
g captures administrative costs and costs of tax collection. The cost is paid conditional on
default by rm i and a fraction i of the shortfall is covered.
The third part of the welfare function captures the externality of nancial crisis and is
the main focus of our analysis. The parameter e measures the severity of the externality
imposed on the economy when the nancial sector is in distress. We dene the indicator for
the occurrence of systemic distress as capturing an event where the capital in the nancial
system falls below a fraction z of the aggregate assets:






The critical feature that we want to capture is that of an aggregate threshold for capital
needed to avoid early re sales and restricted credit supply. Our specic formulation is the
simplest one that captures this eect. The cost is zero as long as aggregate nancial capital
is above this threshold and grows linearly when it falls below. The externality depends
only on the aggregate shortfall of capital in the nancial sector. This is consistent with the
emphasis of the stress tests performed by the US government in the spring odf 2009, and it is
11the crucial dierence between systemic and idiosyncratic risk. It means that a bank failure
occurring in a well capitalized system imposes no externality to the economy. We believe
this captures well the example of Barings Bank, for instance, whose failure in 1995 did not
disrupt the global nancial system. The Dutch bank ING purchased Barings and assumed
all of its liabilities with minimal government involvement and no commitment of tax payer
money. This stands in sharp contrast with the failures of Bear Stearns or Lehman Brothers.
The planer's problem is to choose a tax system that maximizes the welfare function (13)
subject to the same technological constraints as the private agents. This ex-ante (time 0)
regulation is relevant for the systemic risk debate, and this is the one we focus on. We do not
allow the planner to redistribute money among the banks at time 1 because we want to focus
on how to align ex ante incentives and because there are clear operational and informational
constraints that prevent the government from quickly adjusting the marginal utilities in real
time.7 In doing so, we follow the constrained eciency analysis performed in the liquidity
provision literature. In this literature, the planner is typically restricted to aect only the
holding of liquid assets in the initial period (see Lorenzoni, 2008, for instance).
Lastly, we need to account for the taxes that the regulator collects at time 0 and the
various costs borne at time 1. Since we focus on the nancial sector and do not model the
rest of the economy, we simply impose that the aggregate taxes paid by banks at time 0 add




i =  : (15)
There are several interpretations for this equation. One is that the government charges ex-
ante for the expected cost of the debt insurance program. We can also add the expected
cost of the externality. At time 1, the government would simply balance its budget in each
state of the world with lump-sum taxes on the non nancial sector. We can also think of
equation (15) as part of a larger maximization program, where a planner would maximize
utility of banks owners and other agents. This complete program would pin down  , and we
7There would be three reasons for the planner to redistribute money ex-post: dierences in utility func-
tions, dierences in investment opportunities, and the presence of nancial distress costs.
12could then think of our program as solving the problem of a nancial regulator for any given
level of transfer between the banks and the rest of the economy.
2.3 Optimal taxation
Our optimal taxation policy has close parallels to the notion of \marginal expected shortfall"
(MES) used to manage risk inside banks as explained carefully in Section 1. In acknowledg-
ment of this connection, we dene the default expected shortfall (DES) as the expected loss









Further, we dene bank i's systemic expected shortfall (SES) as its the amount its equity
wi
1 drops below its target level, which is a fraction z of assets ai in case of a systemic crisis:
SES
i  E






The SES is the key measure of each bank's expected contribution to a systemic crisis.
Using these two functions we can characterize a tax system that would implement the
optimal allocation. The regulator's problem is to choose the tax scheme  such as to mitigate
systemic risk and inecient eects of debt guarantees. The timing of the implementation is
that the banks choose their leverage and asset allocations and then pay the taxes. The taxes
are therefore conditional on choices made by the banks.










i + 0; (18)
where 0 is a lump sum transfer to satisfy equation (15).
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The set of programs for i = 1;:::;N is equivalent to the planer's program and the budget
constraint can be adjusted ed with 0:
This result is intuitive. Each bank must rst be taxed based on its expected losses in
default DES to the extent that those losses are insured by the government, while recall
that i is the fraction of insured debt. The tax should be lower if raising bank capital is
expensive (c > 1) and higher the more costly is government funds (g); A natural case is
simply to think of g=c = 1 so that this part of the tax is simply an actuarial-fair deposit-
insurance tax.8 Hence, this term in equation (18) corrects the underpricing of credit risk
caused by the debt insurance program. We can write it as
DES







DES is therefore the probability of default times the shortfall of net worth given default.
The relevant point is that it is a measure of a bank's own risk, irrespective of its relation
to the system. In practice, the calculation of the expected shortfall is similar to a standard
Value-at-Risk calculation.
The second part of the tax in (18) depends on the bank's contribution to systemic risk as
captured by SES, scaled by the severity e of the externality and scaled down by the bank's
cost of capital c. This forces the private banks to internalize the externality from aggregate










1) j  I

: (20)
SES is therefore the probability of an aggregate crisis times the conditional loss of rm i in
such a crisis. The important point is that the expectation is conditional on a macroeconomic
shortfall. This calculation is similar to that of marginal risk within nancial rms. In
8Note that it is important for incentives to keep charging this tax even if the FDIC fund collected over
time happened to become over funded
14marginal risk calculation, the risk managers ask how much a particular line of business is
expected to lose on days where the rms hits its VaR constraint. Our formula applies this
idea to the economy as a whole.
The optimal tax system holds for all kinds of nancial distress costs and the planner
reduces its taxes when capital is costly at time 0 (c is high). The fact that we obtain an
expected shortfall measure comes from the shape of the externality function. It is important
to understand the information required to implement the systemic regulation. The planner
does not need to know the utility functions and investment opportunity sets of the various
banks. It needs to estimate two objects: the probability of an aggregate crisis, and the
conditional loss of capital of a particular rm if a crisis occurs.
3 Measuring Systemic Risk
The optimal policy developed in Section 2 calls for a fee (i.e., a tax) equal to the sum of
two components: (i) an institution-risk component, i.e., the expected loss on its guaranteed
liabilities, and (ii) a systemic-risk component, namely, the expected systemic costs in a crisis
(i.e., when the nancial sector becomes undercapitalized) times the nancial institution's
percentage contribution to this undercapitalization. Some comments are in order.
There is much discussion amongst regulators, policymakers and academics of the need
for a resolution fund that would be used to bailout large, complex nancial institutions.
This fund would be paid for by the institutions themselves and is akin to the FDIC. This
resolution fund is essentially the institution-risk component of the above tax and re
ects
the optimal policy that government guarantees in the system (e.g., deposit insurance and
too-big-to-fail) need to be priced. It does not, however, address the systemic risk of the
nancial rms as there is no dierentiation between dierent economic states. Specically,
there is the belief that costs associated with nancial rm losses are signicantly higher in
a crisis.
The systemic-risk component of the tax deals with this particular issue. The systemic
15part is broken up into the product of two terms. The rst term - expected systemic costs -
measures the level of the tax. There is growing evidence on what leads to nancial crises and
the large bailout costs and real economy welfare losses associated with banking crises (see,
for example, Caprio and Klingebiel (1996), Honohan and Klingebiel (2000), Hoggarth, Reis
and Saporta (2002), Reinhart and Rogo (2008), and Borio and Drehmann (2009)). The
bottom line from these studies is that there are leading indicators for banking crises, and
these crises represent signicant portions of GDP, on the order of 10%-20%. The important
point is that, depending on the likelihood of a crisis, the systemic-risk component of the tax
may be quite important.
The second term { % contribution of the nancial institution to losses incurred by a
nancial sector collapse - determines which institutions pay more tax. That is, the main
object of interest for the regulation of systemic risk is the expected dollar loss of capital of a
rm conditional on the occurrence of a crisis. In practice, to implement the optimal policy,
the planner needs to estimate the conditional expected losses before a crisis occurs. Our
theory says that the regulator should use any variable that can predict capital shortfall in a
crisis. In order to improve our economic intuition and to impose discipline on our empirical
analysis, it is important to have a theoretical understanding of the variables that are likely
to be useful for these predictions.
3.1 Measuring Systemic Risk: Intuition
A large focus of regulators and policymakers on managing systemic risk has been on the size
of nancial institution's assets and/or liabilities. The theory described in Section II gives
some support for this approach. Almost trivially, ceteris paribus, the expected losses of a
nancial rm conditional on a crisis are tied one-for-one to the size of the rm's assets. In
fact, Appendix B of the paper provides the % contribution of each rm's $ MES across the
102 largest nancial rms (i.e., rms with over $5 billion of market equity). The top 6 in
terms of contribution (Citigroup (4.87%), JP Morgan (3.60%), Bank of America (3.54%),
Morgan Stanley (2.51%), Goldman Sachs (2.41%) and Merrill Lynch (2.25%)) are also in the
16top 7 in terms of total number of assets. Of course, even though a rm that doubles its size
would pay, to a rst approximation, twice the systemic tax, the rm would also have twice
the cash 
ow to cover the tax. Therefore, from an economic point of view, the interesting
question is what variables help explain the % expected losses (as opposed to $ losses).
Our theory says that the regulation of systemic risk should be based on SES. Equation
(20) shows that there are two main pieces to estimate. The rst is the probability Pr
  I

of a systemic event. The unconditional risk can be measured using historical research as in
Reinhart and Rogo (2008). The conditional risk can be inferred from dynamic long-run
volatility models and implied volatilities for long-dated assets from option prices (Engle,
2009).
We focus on the cross-sectional part. Control for each bank's size, we scale by initial
equity wi















  1 j  I

:
The rst part, zai
wi
0   1, measures whether the leverage ai
wi
0 is initially already \too high".
Specically, since systemic crises happen when aggregate bank capital falls below z times
assets, z times leverage should be less than 1. Hence, a positive value of zai
wi
0   1 means
that the bank is already under-capitalized at time 0. We can think of z as being in the
range of 8% top 12%. The second term is the expected equity return conditional on the
occurrence of a crisis. Hence, the sum of these two terms determine whether the bank will
be under-capitalized in a crisis.
In practice, the planner needs to estimate the conditional expected losses before a crisis
occurs. Our theory says that the regulator should use any variable that can predict capital
shortfall in a crisis. In order to improve our economic intuition and to impose discipline on
our empirical analysis, it is important to have a theoretical understanding of the variables
that are likely to be useful for these predictions so we want to relate SES to observed equity
returns.
We can think of the  I events in our model as extreme tail events happening once a decade
or less (in the US at least). In the meantime, we observe \normal" tail events. Let us dene
17these events as the worst 5% market outcomes at daily frequency which we denote by I5%.
Based on these events, we can dene a marginal expected shortfall (MES) using net equity









  1 j I5%

:
We measure MES using a sample of negative market returns, but typically without observing
a default so we can think of equity value as being always positive in the sample of I5% events.










s follows a thin-tailed (Gaussian for instance) distribution while i
s and m follow
independent normalized power law distributions with tail exponent . Power laws dominate
in the tail so we have the following simple properties (Gabaix, 2009). First, the VaR of ri
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. Using the power laws, we obtain the following proposition.
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9 Note that if we assume returns are multivariate normal, then the drivers of the rm's % systemic
risk would be entirely determined by the expected return and volatility of the aggregate sector return and
volatility, and their correlation. However, there is growing consensus that the tails of return distributions are
not described by multivariate normal processes and much more suited to that of extreme value theory (e.g.,
see Barro (2006), Backus, Chernov and Martin (2009), Gabaix (2009) and Kelly (2009)). Our discussion
helps clarify what variables are needed to measure systemic risk in the presence of extreme values.
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We see that SES has three components: Excess ex ante leverage zai
wi
0   1, the measured
marginal expected shortfall MES using pre-crisis data, scaled up by k to account for the
worse performance in the true crisis, and i which comes from two sources. The term fi bi
measures the excess returns on bonds due to credit risk. This dierence is xed and does




i j  I

  k  E [i j I5%] measures the excess costs of nancial distress. It
is potentially more signicant because we do not expect these costs to scale up with k as
returns do. In practice, our estimation sample contains bad market days, but no real crisis.
In these \normal" bad days we do not expect to pick up signicant costs of distress. In
other words, we are likely to measure E [i j I5%]  0. On the other hand, we denitely
expect E

i j  I

to be signicant, especially for highly levered rms. We therefore expect
MES to underestimate SES for highly levered rms. In essence, our formula (21) assumes
that the I5% events capture the power law that dominates tail risk. This is probably a
fair assumption in commercial and investment banking. On the other hand, there could be
a more signicant bias in industries such as insurance where the industry leaders were all
rated AAA before the crisis and distress or tail risk can only be seen in the most extreme
19events.10 Also in these cases, equity market data may be somewhat less suitable or adequate
compared to cds market data: By construction, cds fee is (approximately) the price of a tail
risk event, namely the rm's default, and hence conveys more direct information about tail
risk of the underlying rm than the rm's equity price does. Our empirical analysis to follow
will employ both equity and cds data.
4 Empirical Analysis of the Crisis of 2007-2009
The theory of systemic risk presented in Section 2 and the underlying measurement issues
described in Section 3 suggest that the relative systemic risk across rms can be measured
cross-sectionally by just a few variables, two in particular being the marginal expected short-
fall MES and leverage of the rm.
With respect to the former, we empirically estimate MES at a standard risk level of
=5% using daily data of equity returns from CRSP.11 This means that we take the 5%
worst days for the market returns (R) in any given year, and we then compute the average
return on any given rm (Rb) for these days. Even though these days clearly do not capture
the tails of a nancial crisis, we motivate its use via our power law analysis in Section 3.1.
With respect to leverage, as shown by the current nancial crisis, it is not straightforward to
measure true leverage due to limited market data and breakdown of o- and on-balance sheet
nancing. Nevertheless, we apply the usual approach to measuring leverage. Specically,
since market value of debt is generally unavailable, it is standard instead to use the quasi-
market value of assets. This is computed as [book value of assets book value of equity
10Another way of saying this is that rms that are in the business of writing insurance against tail risks
are less amenable to measurement of systemic risk using their normal time market data. Examples of such
insurance are selling of deep out-of-the-money put options on the market, credit default swaps on portfolios
of loans and mortgages (as were sold by A.I.G.), or liquidity puts to conduits (as was the case with Citigroup,
documented by Acharya, Schnabl and Suarez, 2009). Acharya, Cooley, Richardson and Walter (2010) propose
that \manufacturing tail risk" in this manner might have become the evolving business model of banking
during 2004-2007 precisely to game the regulatory structure centered on measuring individual bank risks.
11As described later in this Section, a series of robustness checks are also performed.
20+ market value of equity]. The book characteristics of rms are available at a quarterly
frequency from CRSP-Compustat merged dataset. We call the ratio of quasi-market value
of assets to market value of equity as LVG in the empirical analysis to follow. 12
In this section, we investigate three examples of emerging systemic risk in the nancial
crisis and analyze the ability of the theoretically motivated measures to capture this risk.
Specically, we look at the relation between our measures and (i) capital shortfalls at large
nancial institutions estimated via stress tests performed by bank regulators during the
Spring of 2009, (ii) realized systemic risk that emerged in the equity of large nancial rms
from July 2007 through the end of 2008, and (ii) realized systemic risk that emerged in the
credit default swaps (cds) of large nancial rms from July 2007 through the end of 2008.
In brief summary, across all three examples, the results are consistent with implications
of the theory. In particular, simple measures of systemic risk implied by the theory have
useful information for which rms ran aground during the nancial crisis.
4.1 The Supervisory Capital Assessment Program
At the peak of the nancial crisis, in late February 2009, the government announced a series
of stress tests were to be performed on the 19 largest banks over a two-month period. In
particular, known as the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP), the Federal
Reserve's goal was to provide a consistent assessment of the capital held by these banks.
The question asked on each bank was how much of an additional capital buer, if any, each
bank would need to make sure it had sucient capital if the economy got worse and the
nancial crisis started up again.
In early May of 2009, the results of the analysis were released to the public at large. A
total of 10 banks were required to raise $74.6 billion in capital. The SCAP was generally
considered to be a credible test with bank examiners imposing severe loss estimates on
12A sample calculation here would be useful. As presented in Appendix B, in June 2007, the MES of Bear
Stearns is 3.15% and its LVG is 25.62. That is, its average loss on 5% worst case days of the market was
3.15% and its quasi-market assets to market equity ratio was 25.62.
21residential mortgages and other consumer loans, not seen since the Great Depression.
The SCAP is an especially useful period to analyze to gauge the systemic risk measures
described in this paper. The SCAP can be considered as close as possible to an ex ante
estimate of expected losses in a nancial crisis. The regulators spent two months examining
the portfolios and nancing of the largest banks with a particular emphasis on creating
consistent valuations across these banks. Table 1 provides a summary of each bank, including
its shortfall (if any) from the SCAP at the end of April 2009, its tier 1 capital (so called
core capital including common shares, preferred shares, and deferred tax assets), its tangible
common equity (just its common shares), its measured MES (from April 2008 to March
2009) and its quasi market leverage. Five banks, as a percent of their Tier 1 capital, had
considerable shortfalls, namely Regions Financial (20.66%), Bank of America (19.57%), Wells
Fargo (15.86%), Keycorp (15.52%) and Suntrust Banks (12.50%).13
The question is how well do the systemic risk measures capture the SCAP estimates of
systemic losses across these 17 rms? Table 2 provides an OLS regression analysis of both
MES and leverage on the SCAP shortfall as a percent of tier 1 capital (panel A) and tangible
common equity (panel B). Because a number of rms have no shortfall, and thus there is a
mass of observations at zero, we also extend the OLS regressions to a Probit analysis.
MES is strongly signicant in both the OLS and Probit regressions. For example, in the
OLS regressions of MES on tier 1 capital and tangible common equity respectively, the t-
statistics are 3.00 and 3.12 with adjusted R-squareds of 32.03% and 33.19%. When leverage
is added, the adjusted R-squareds either drop or are marginally larger. Not surprisingly, the
adjusted R-squareds jump considerably for the Probit regressions, with the tier 1 capital
regressions reaching 40.68% and, with leverage included, 53.22%. The important point is
13The interested reader might be surprised to see that, although it required additional capital, Citigroup
was not one of the leading rms. It should be pointed out, however, that towards the end of 2008 Citigroup
received $301 billion of federal asset guarantees on their portfolio of troubled assets. Conversations with the
Federal Reserve conrm that these guarantees were treated as such for application of the stress test. JP
Morgan and Bank of America also received guarantees (albeit in smaller amounts) through their purchase
of Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch, respectively.
22that the systemic risk measures seem to capture quite well the SCAP estimates of % expected
losses in a crisis.
As an additional analysis, the same regressions were run using MES and leverage mea-
sured prior to the failure of Lehman Brothers in mid September 2008, in other words, us-
ing information from October 2007 to September 2008. While the results are in general
agreement with the earlier ones, in particular MES is statistically signicant, the adjusted
R-squareds drop considerably for both measures of capital and for both the OLS and Probit
Regressions with a range of 11% to 18%. Of course, the Federal Reserves SCAP would also
have been considerably dierent prior to Lehman Brothers failure.
4.2 The Financial Crisis: July 2007 to December 2008
To illustrate the computation of our systemic risk measures and their power in explaining
the performance of rms during a systemic crisis, we focus on a \demo" period surrounding
the subprime crisis. We consider 102 nancial rms in the US nancial sector with equity
market capitalization as of end of June 2007 in excess of 5bln USD. Appendix A lists these
rms and their \type" based on two-digit SIC code classication (Depository Institutions,
Securities Dealers and Commodity Brokers, Insurance, and Others). For sake of illustration,
we use the CRSP value-weighted index as the \market". Note that our model suggests the
market should be the aggregate of the rms under investigation and we examine robustness
of our results to nancial sector aggregate as the market. We use daily stock return data
from CRSP.
The overall idea is to estimate the ex ante MES and leverage using data from the year
prior to the crisis (June 2006 till June 2007) and use it to explain the cross-sectional variation
in performance during the crisis (July 2007 till December 2008). As explained in Section
3.1, we identied two inputs: rst, the Marginal Expected Shortfall MES, which we choose
to compute at 5% worst case days for the market, and second, the leverage of each rm l.
While analyzing the performance of MES and LVG, it is important to also check their
incremental power relative to other measures of risk. For this, we focus on measures of rm-
23level risk: the expected shortfall, ES (i.e., the negative of the rm's average stock return
in its own 5% left tail), and the annualized standard deviation of returns based on daily
stock returns, Vol. We also look at the standard measure of systematic risk, Beta, which
is the covariance of a rm's stock returns with the market divided by variance of market
returns. Thus, the dierence between our systemic risk measure Beta arises from two sources:
systemic risk is based on tail dependence rather than average covariance, and it is corrected
for leverage of the rm. We want to compare these ex ante risk measures to the ex post
Event Return, that is, the realized return of nancial rms during the period July 2007-Dec
2008.
Table 3 describes the summary statistics of all these risk measures, where Panel A re-
ports the univariate statistics and Panel B the pair-wise correlations. The Event Return in
Panel A illustrate how stressful this period were for the nancial rms, with mean (median)
return being  46% ( 47%) and several rms losing their entire equity market capitalization
(Washington Mutual, Fannie Mae and Lehman Brothers). It is useful to compare ES and
MES. While the average return of a nancial in its own left tail is  2:73%, it is  1:63%
when the market is in its left tail. The market itself has an ES of  1:4% implying that the
equally-weighted average return of nancials when market is in its left tail is worse than the
value-weighted average return (which is of course the market itself). Average volatility of
nancial stock returns are 21% with a beta of 1.0. The power law application in Section 3.1
suggests that an important component of systemic risk is LVG, the quasi-market assets to
market equity ratio. This measure is on average 5.26 (median of 4.59), but it has several
important outliers. The highest value of LVG is 25.62 (for Bear Stearns) and the lowest is
just 1.01. All these measures however exhibit substantial cross-sectional variability, which
we attempt to explain later.
Panel B shows that individual rm risk measures (ES and Vol) are highly correlated, and
so are dependence measures between rms and the market (MES and Beta). Naturally, the
realized returns during the crisis (realized SES) are negatively correlated to the risk measures
and, interestingly, realized SES is most correlated with LVG, Log-Assets and MES, in that
24order.
We also examine the behavior of risk and systemic risk across types of institutions based
on the nature of their business and capital structure. As shown in Appendix A, we rely on
four categories of institutions: (1) Depository institutions (29 companies with 2-digit SIC
code of 60); (2) Miscellaneous non-depository institutions including real estate rms whom
we often refer to as \Other" (27 companies with codes of 61, 62 except 6211, 65 or 67); (3)
Insurance companies (36 companies with code of 63 or 64); and (4) Security and Commodity
Brokers (10 companies with 4-digit SIC code of 6211. 14
Panel C provides the univariate statistics of all the relevant risk measures by institution
type. There are several interesting observations to be made. Depository institutions and
insurance rms have lower absolute levels of risk, measured both by ES and Vol. These
institutions also have lower dependence with the market, MES and Beta. The leverage, quasi-
market assets to equity ratio, is however higher for depository institutions and securities
dealers and brokers. When all this is in theory combined into our estimate of systemic risk
measure, in terms of realized SES, insurance rms are overall the least systemically risky,
next were depository institutions, and most systemically risky are the securities dealers and
brokers. Importantly, by any measure of risk, individual or systemic, securities dealers and
brokers are always the riskiest. In other words, the systemic risk of these institutions is
high not just because they are riskier in an absolute risk sense, but they have greater tail
dependence with the market (MES) as well as the highest leverage (LVG); in particular,
their MES is about twice the median MES of nancial rms and their leverage is twice as
high as the median leverage of nancial rms.
Table 4 and Figures 2 and 3 show the power of MES and leverage in explaining the realized
performance of nancial rms during a systemic crisis. In particular, Table 2 contains cross-
sectional regressions of realized returns during July 2007-Dec 2008 on the pre-crisis measures
14Note that Goldman Sachs has a SIC code of 6282 but we classify it as part of the Security and Commodity
Brokers group. Some of the critical members of other category are American Express, Black Rock, various
exchanges, and Fannie and Freddie, the latter being of course signicant candidates for systemically risky
institutions.
25of risk, MES, LVG, Log Assets, Vol, Beta and ES, respectively, and Figures 2 and 3 show
the corresponding scatter plots. (We also note that Appendix B provides the rm-level data
on MES and LVG.)
Figure 2 shows that MES does a reasonably good job of explaining the realized returns
(R2 of 6.72%), and naturally a higher MES is associated with a more negative return during
the crisis. A few cases illustrate the point well. We can see that Bear Stearns, Lehman
Brothers, CIT and Merrill Lynch have relatively high MES and these rms lose a large
chunk of their equity market capitalization. There are, however, also some reasons to be
concerned. For example, exchanges (NYX, ICE, ETFC) have relatively high MES but we do
not think of these as systemic primarily because they are not as leveraged as say investment
banks are.
Similarly, while A.I.G. and Berkshire Hathaway have relatively low MES, A.I.G.'s leverage
at 6.12 is above the mean leverage whereas that of Berkshire is much lower at 2.29 and
thus the two should be viewed dierently from a systemic risk standpoint. Figure 3 shows
that leverage does even better at explaining the realized returns (R2 of 24.27%), and the
combination of MES and LVG show an even better t:
Realizedreturn = 0:02   0:12[1other]   0:01[1Insurance]
+ 0:16[1broker dealer]   0:15MES
   0:04LV G
 (22)
with an R2 =27.34%. Thus adjusting MES for leverage of nancial rms helps understanding
their systemic risk better.
In this light, exchanges are no longer as systemic as investment banks and A.I.G. looks far
more systemic than Berkshire Hathaway. Further inspection of the rm-level data (Appendix
B) reveals that the ve investment banks rank in top ten both by their MES and leverage
rankings, but this stability across measures is not a property of all other rms. For example,
Countrywide is ranked 24th by MES given its MES of 2.09%, but given its high leverage of
10.39 has a combined ranking of 6th using equation 22 (labeled in Appendix B as \Fitted
Rank"). Similarly, Freddie Mac is ranked 61st by its MES but given its high leverage of 21
(comparable to that of investment banks), it ranks 2nd, in terms of its combined ranking. On
26the 
ip side, CB Richard Ellis, a real-estate rm, has 5th rank in MES but given low leverage
of 1.55 ranks only 24th in terms of combined ranking. Investment banks, Countrywide and
Freddie all collapsed or nearly collapsed, whereas CB Richard Ellis survived, highlighting
the importance of the leverage correction in systemic risk measurement.
In contrast to the statistically signicant role of MES in explaining cross-sectional returns,
traditional risk measures Beta and ES do not perform that well. The R2 with Beta is just
3.62% and that with ES is basically 0.0%. These results are also summarized in Table 4 which
has three additional results. First, column (3) shows that Vol, another measure of individual
rm risk does very poorly in explaining realized returns, in fact with essentially zero R2.
Second, in the regressions that include LVG and MES together, institutional characteristics
no longer show up as signicant. This suggests that the systemic risk measures do a fairly
good job of capturing, for example, the risk of broker dealers. Third, column (8), however,
shows that the log of assets comes in quite strong with an R2 around 18.5%. While its
signicance drops substantially once leverage is included, it still shows up in the regression
analysis. The negative sign on log of assets suggests that size not only aects the $ systemic
risk contribution of nancial rms but also the % systemic risk contribution as well. In
particular, large rms create more systemic risk than a likewise combination of smaller
rms.
Figure 4 graphs a scatter plot of the MES computed during June 2006-June 2007 versus
that computed during June 2005-2006. Even though there is no overlap between the return
series, the plot generally shows a fair amount of stability from year to year with this particular
systemic risk measure. Wide time-series variation in relative MES would make the optimal
policy more dicult to implement. It is of interest therefore to examine how early MES and
LVG predict the cross-section of realized returns during the crisis. We compute MES and
SES over several periods other than the June 2006-07 \demo" period: June 06-May 07, May
06-Apr 07, Apr 06-Mar 07 and Mar 06-Feb 07. In each period, we use the entire data of daily
stock returns on nancial rms and the market, and the last available data on book assets
and equity to calculate quasi-market measure of assets to equity ratio. Once the measures
27are calculated for each of these periods, the exercise is always to explain the realized returns
during the same crisis period of July 2007 to December 2008.
In contrast with Figure 4, Panel A shows that the predictive power of MES progressively
declines as we use lagged data for computing the measure. The overall predictive power,
however, remains high as leverage has certain persistent, cross-sectional characteristics across
nancial rms. The coecients on LVG remain unchanged throughout these periods. To
better understand the MES decline, we repeat the Panel A regressions using two alternative
measures of MES: (i) W-MES, a weighted MES, which uses exponentially declining weights
( = 0:94 following the Risk Metrics parameter) on past observations to estimate the average
equity returns on the 5% worst days of the market, and (ii) D-MES, a dynamic approach
to estimating MES, which uses a dynamic conditional correlation (DCC) model with fat
idiosyncratic tails.15 Panel B and Panel C provide the results for W-MES and D-MES,
respectively. The adjusted R2s are generally higher and the alternative measures of MES
better hold their predictive power. For example, the coecients are still strongly signicant
using the April06-Mar07 data, with the t-statistics and R2s equal to ( 1:24,  2:94,  2:36)
and (22.61%, 27.76%, 24.58%) respectively for MES, W-MES and D-MES. These results
suggest there is some value to exploring more sophisticated methods for estimating MES.
4.3 Using CDS to Measure Systemic Risk
Section IV.B above illustrated the ability of the MES and leverage of nancial rms to
forecast the equity performance of the 102 largest nancial rms during the nancial crisis
period of July 2007 to December 2008. In this subsection, we add to this evidence by focusing
on the credit default swaps (cds) of these same nancial rms. Of the 102 nancial rms, 40
of them have enough unsecured long-term debt to warrant the existence of cds in the credit
derivatives market. Appendix C provides a list of the 40 rms, their type of institution, and
stylized facts about their MES based on the cds market, including ranking, MES%, and
15We are grateful to Christian Brownlees and Robert Engle of New York University Stern School of
Business for sharing with us their dynamic measures of MES for our sample rms.
28realized CDS spread returns during the crisis period.
A few important issues arise using cds data. The rst question arises how to operational-
ize the cds data for calculating MES. The cds premium resembles the spread between risky
and riskless 
oating rate debt, denote this spread as s. To garner some intuition, note that
dP=P =  Dds and dP=P = dV=V , where P is the bond price, V the value of the rm's
assets,  is the elasticity of the bond price to rm value, and D is the bond's duration.
Combining the two relationships, we obtain that ds =  =DdV=V . Ignoring the duration
term changes across rms/days means that measuring the rm's losses, i.e., dV=V , using the
spread change ds is proportional to its bond elasticity . Since we know that  is approxi-
mately 0 when the bond is close to risk-free and approximately 1 when the bond is virtually
in default, ds attaches close to zero weight to dV=V for safe rms (when leverage is very low)
and high weight (equal to 1/D) to dV=V for very risky rms (when leverage is very high).
Therefore, a better measure of rm value changes is ds=s =  =(Ds)dV=V , where s is tiny
when eta is close to zero and s is large when eta is close to one.
In terms of the cds MES, therefore, we empirically estimate MES at a standard risk level
of 5% using daily data of cds returns, ds=s, from the data provider Bloomberg.16 This means
that we take the 5% worst days for an equally-weighted portfolio of cds returns on the 40
nancial rms from June 2006 to July 2007, and we then compute the cds return for any
given rm for these days.17 Appendix C provides some interesting stylized facts given the
fact that the cds MES estimates are all pre-crisis. Consider the top 3 nancial institutions
in terms of highest cds MES in each institutional category:
 The 3 insurance companies are Genworth Financial (16.40%), Ambac Financial (8.05%)
and MBIA (6.71%). All of these companies were heavily involved in providing nancial
guaranties for structured products in the credit derivatives area.
 The top 3 depository institutions are Wachovia (7.21%), Citigroup (6.80%) and Wash-
16Our results are robust to the sample of rms for which data are available from Markit, and the overlapping
sample of rms between Bloomberg and Markit.
17For comparison purposes, we also use changes in the cds spread.
29ington Mutual (6.15%). These institutions are generally considered to ex post have
been most exposed to the nonprime mortgage area, with two of them, Wachovia and
Washington Mutual, actually failing.
 The top three broker dealers are Merrill Lynch (6.3%), Lehman Brothers (5.44%) and
Morgan Stanley (4.86%). Two of these three institutions eectively failed.18
 The top three others, SLM Corp (6.82%), CIT Group (6.80%) and Fannie Mae (5.70%),
also ran into trouble due to their exposure to credit markets, with both CIT going
bankrupt and Fannie Mae being put into conservatorship.
Even putting these results aside, the second issue is that cds may not re
ect predicted
losses of the nancial rm to the extent some rms have more government guarantees as part
of their capital structure, such as deposit institutions, the government sponsored enterprises
and so-called too-big-to-fail rms.19 Since cds re
ect estimated creditor losses, the backstop
will lead to pricing distortions cross-sectionally. As a result, in terms of systemic risk, we
analyze the ability of cds MES to forecast systemic risk in both the July 2007 to December
2008, and the July 2007 to June 2008 period (i.e., prior to many government guarantees
being made explicit). To further address this issue, we also investigate the ability of cds
MES to forecast not only future CDS returns, but also equity returns.
Figures 5-8 respectively show scatter plots of cds MES on realized CDS returns in the
July 2007-June 2008 and July 2007-December 2008 period, and on realized equity returns
in the July 2007-June 2008 and July 2007-December 2008 period. The results are also
strongly supportive of the ability of cds MES to forecast future changes in rm value during
a nancial crisis, whether estimated by cds or equity returns. To the point above, the
18We note here that if Bear Stearns cds return were measured until the point of its arranged merger with
J P Morgan in mid-March 2008, its realized cds return would be higher than having measured it till dates
thereafter.
19Equity also suers from this problem to the extent government guarantees delay bankruptcy and thus
extend the option of the rm to continue. It is more likely a second order eect, however, compared to the
pricing of the underlying debt of nancial rms in distress.
30slope line is slightly 
atter (steeper) for cds (equity) returns in the December 2008 end of
sample period versus the June 2008 period. Since the crisis got considerably worse during
the latter 6 months of 2008, this nding is consistent with the government making a number
of guarantees explicit (e..g, the government sponsored enterprises, A.I.G., and in general the
capital assistance programs related to TARP).
Table 6 provides summary statistics for cds MES (measured using log return or arithmetic
dierence) and the realized returns (realized SES) using cds or equity returns and over the
two dierent time periods (July 2007-June 2008 and July 2007-December 2008). It is clear
based on raw correlations that cds MES are well correlated with realized returns, for both
cds and equity markets. It is to be noted that given the pre-July 2007 credit conditions, cds
MES is rather low on average and in its variation across rms, whereas the realized cds and
equity returns during the crisis are high and highly variable. The correlation of cds MES
with realized returns is thus especially noteworthy.
For a more formal analysis, Table 7 provides regressions of both cds MES based on cds
returns (Panel A) or cds spread changes (Panel B) on realized cds returns during dierent
periods covering the crisis (July 2007-June 2008 / September 14, 2008 / September 30, 2008
/ 0ctober 10, 2008 / December 30, 2008) related to government action on creditor guarantees.
Several observations are in order. First, putting aside the date of TARP capital assistance
in October, the R2s are between 17.86% to 19.94%. Second, in terms of cds MES versus
leverage, cds MES is generally the more signicant variable. Because cds re
ects the claim
on the underlying debt, this is consistent with cds MES capturing more of the tail behavior
and thus being less reliant on the leverage arguments provided in Section 3.1. Third, there
are substantive drops in explanatory power when cds spread changes are used instead of cds
returns. This is consistent with the aforementioned argument on the need to be careful with
respect to operationalizing cds MES.
As nal evidence, Table 8 provides formal statistics for regressions of both cds MES
based on cds returns (Panel A) or cds spread changes (Panel B) on realized equity returns
during the same periods as Table 7. The results are quite strong with both cds MES and
31leverage coming in at very high signicant levels with adjusted R2s of 50% or higher using cds
returns (and 30% plus using cds spread changes). The important point is that the systemic
risk measures prior to the crisis have important information for which rms might run into
trouble, and, therefore, by inference should, according to the optimal policy, be taxed to
induce them to reduce their systemic risk. While cds MES seems especially useful prior to
the start of the crisis, it is an open question that this will continue in the future with all the
government guarantees now in place.
5 Related Literature on Measuring Systemic Risk
A number of recent papers have derived measures of systemic risk, mostly related to the
nancial crisis of 2007-2009. These papers can broadly be separated into two categories, one
based on a structural approach using contingent claims analysis of the nancial institution's
assets and the other on a reduced form approach focusing on the tail behavior of nancial
institutions' asset returns. Consistent with the intuition provided in Section 2, all these
approaches have the common feature of treating systemic risk in a portfolio context in which
the portfolio is the nancial sector, and individual assets are the nancial institutions. As
shown in Section 2 and argued in Section 3.1 above, the key variable must be the comovement
between nancial rms when the system as a whole is distressed.
With respect to contingent claims analysis, Lehar (2005) estimates the dynamics between
nancial institution's assets using stock market data and a Merton model of bank liabilities.
For dierent periods and countries, Lehar then measures the regulator's total liability (if
creditor were to be bailed out) and the contribution of each institution to this liability.
Gray, Merton, and Bodie (2008) also use a contingent claims approach to provide an overall
way of measuring systemic risk across dierent sectors and countries. Gray and Jobst (2009)
apply the methodology to the current nancial crisis, and quantify the largest institutions'
contributions to systemic risk in this crisis.
There are complexities in applying the contingent claims analysis in practice due to
32the strong assumptions that need to be made about the liability structure of the nancial
institutions. As an alternative, some researchers have used market data to back out reduced-
form measures of systemic risk. For example, Huang, Zhou and Zhu (2009) use data on
credit default swaps (CDS) of nancial rms and stock return correlations across these
rms to estimate expected credit losses above a given share of the nancial sector's total
liabilities. Similarly, Adrian and Brunnermeier (2009) measure the nancial sector's Value
at Risk (VaR) given that a bank has had a VaR loss, which they denote CoVaR, using
quantile regressions. Their measure uses data on market equity and book value of the debt
to construct the underlying asset returns.
Tarashev, Borio and Tsatsaronis (2009) present a game-theoretic formulation that also
provides a possible allocation of capital charge to each institution based on its systemic
importance. Farhi and Tirole (2009) model collective moral hazard and systemic bailouts.
Finally, Segoviano and Goodhart (2009) also view the nancial sector as a portfolio of indi-
vidual nancial rms, and look at how individual rms contribute to the potential distress
of the system by using the CDSs of these rms within a multivariate setting.
Compared to these papers, our contribution is to build an explicit bridge between the
structural and reduced-form approaches. On the one hand, we build a structural (albeit
simple) model that provides the systemic contribution of each nancial institution under
reasonable assumptions. On the other hand, this systemic contribution can be written in
terms of observables common to the reduced form approaches. Thus, systemic risk can be
estimated using standard techniques and market data, as we illustrated for the nancial
crisis of 2007-2009.
6 Conclusion
Current nancial regulations seek to limit each institution's risk. Unless the external costs
of systemic risk are internalized by each nancial institution, the institution will have the
incentive to take risks that are borne by all. An illustration is the current crisis in which
33nancial institutions had levered up on similar large portfolios of securities and loans which
faced little idiosyncratic risk, but large amounts of systematic risk. In this paper, we argued
that nancial regulation be focused on limiting systemic risk, that is, the risk of a crisis in
the nancial sector and its spillover to the economy at large.
We provided a simple and intuitive way to measure each bank's contribution to systemic
risk, suggesting ways to limit it. While we estimated and tested our proposed systemic
risk measure using equity and cds data, another way to obtain such information is through
prices of out-of-the-money equity options and insurances against losses of individual rms
when the system as a whole is in stress. Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon and Richardson (2009,
2010) propose regulation of systemic risk based on mandatory purchase of such insurances by
nancial rms, partly from private sources (insurance companies) and rest from a systemic
risk regulator.
Finally, recent proposals to contain systemic risk (based among others on Flannery, 2005
and Kashyap, Rajan and Stein, 2008) suggest requiring rms to issue \contingent capital",
which is debt that gets automatically converted to equity when certain rm-level and sys-
temic triggers are hit. Our systemic risk measure corresponds precisely to states in which
such triggers will be hit, implying that it should be possible to use our measure to predict
which rms are more systemic and therefore will nd contingent capital more binding ex
post. Employing such market-based measures to guide and aid future regulation may reduce
the regulatory (and, unfortunately therefore, discretionary) burden of classifying institutions
as more or less systemic.
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38Table 1: Banks Included in the Stress Test, Descriptive Statistics. 
 
Panel A of this table contains the values of SCAP shortfall, Tier1, Tier1 Comm, SCAP Shortfall/Tier1, SCAP Shortfall/Tier1 
Comm, MES and LVG for the 18 banks who underwent stress testing. MES is the marginal expected shortfall of a 
stock given that the market return is below its 5
th-percentile. Leverage (LVG) is measured as quasi-market value of 
assets divided by market value of equity, where quasi-market value of assets is book value of assets minus book 
value of equity + market value of equity. Panel B showcases the correlation between SCAP Shortfall/Tier1, SCAP 
Shortfall/Tier1 Comm, MES and LVG. 
 
All stock market data are from Datastream and book value of equity is from the merged CRSP-Compustat database. MES was 
measured for each individual company’s stock using the period April 2008 till March 2009 and the S&P 500 as the 
market portfolio. LVG is as of first quarter 2009. 
Panel A 
Bank Name  SCAP  Tier1  Tier1Comm  SCAP/Tier1  SCAP/Tier1Comm  MES  LVG 
REGIONS FINANCIAL CORP NEW           2.5  12.1  7.6  20.66%  32.89%  14.8  44.42 
BANK OF AMERICA CORP                 33.9  173.2  75  19.57%  45.50%  15.05  50.38 
WELLS FARGO & CO NEW                 13.7  86.4  34  15.86%  40.41%  10.57  20.58 
KEYCORP NEW                          1.8  11.6  6  15.52%  30.00%  15.44  24.36 
SUNTRUST BANKS INC                   2.2  17.6  9.4  12.50%  23.40%  12.91  39.85 
FIFTH THIRD BANCORP                  1.1  11.9  4.9  9.24%  22.45%  14.39  67.16 
CITIGROUP INC                        5.5  118.8  23  4.63%  24.02%  14.98  126.7 
MORGAN STANLEY DEAN WITTER & CO      1.8  47.2  18  3.81%  10.11%  15.17  25.39 
P N C FINANCIAL SERVICES GRP INC     0.6  24.1  12  2.49%  5.13%  10.55  21.58 
AMERICAN EXPRESS CO                  0  10.1  10  0.00%  0.00%  9.75  7.8 
B B & T CORP                         0  13.4  7.8  0.00%  0.00%  9.57  14.78 
BANK NEW YORK INC                    0  15.4  11  0.00%  0.00%  11.09  6.46 
CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORP           0  16.8  12  0.00%  0.00%  10.52  33.06 
GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP INC              0  55.9  34  0.00%  0.00%  9.97  18.94 
JPMORGAN CHASE & CO                  0  136.2  87  0.00%  0.00%  10.45  20.43 
METLIFE INC                          0  30.1  28  0.00%  0.00%  10.28  26.14 
STATE STREET CORP                    0  14.1  11  0.00%  0.00%  14.79  10.79 
U S BANCORP DEL                      0  24.4  12  0.00%  0.00%  8.54  10.53 
               
Panel B: Correlation Matrix 
        SCAP/Tier1  SCAP/Tier1Comm  MES  LVG 
      SCAP/Tier1  100.00%       
      SCAP/Tier1Comm  95.42%  100.00%     
      MES  59.48%  61.47%  100.00%   
      LVG  31.58%  48.20%  53.70%  100.00% Table 2: OLS Regression and Probit Regression Analyses. 
 
In Panel A the dependent variable is SCAP Shortfall/Tier1 and in Panel B it is SCAP Shortfall/Tier1Comm. 
Models (I)-(III) are regression analyses based on MES and LVG computed during, respectively end-of the period 
April08-March09. Models (IV)-(VI) are the equivalent Probit regression results. Models (VII)-(XII) repeat the 
analysis using the period Oct07-Sep08. T-stats are reported in brackets for the OLS regression coefficient estimates. 
In the Probit regressions the dependent variable is converted into a binary variable by only considering non-zero or 
zero values. The reported R
2 is then the Pseudo R
2.  
 
Panel A: Dependent Variable is SCAP Shortfall/Tier1 
  April08-March09  Oct07-Sep08 
  OLS  Probit  OLS  Probit 
  (I)  (II)  (III)  (IV)  (V)  (VI)  (VII)  (VIII)  (IX)  (X)  (XI)  (XII) 
























MES  1.91 
(3.00) 












  0.21 
(0.67) 
















                         
Adj. R
2  32.03%  4.65%  27.5%  40.68%  45.09%  53.22%  18.27%  -3.46%  13.61%  11.06%  15.17%  17.3% 
                         
No. Obs  18  18  18  18  18  18  18  18  18  18  18  18 
                         
Panel B: Dependent Variable is SCAP Shortfall/Tier1Comm 
  April08-March09  Oct07-Sep08 
  OLS    OLS   
  (I)  (II)  (III)        (VII)  (VIII)  (IX)       












     
MES  4.05 
(3.12) 
  3.29 
(2.13) 
      6 
(2.09) 
  6.57 
(1.94) 
     








     
                         
Adj. R
2  33.19%  18.44%  33.17%        16.57%  -3.56%  11.69%       
                         
No. Obs  18  18  18        18  18  18       
 
 
 Table 3: Summary statistics and correlation matrix of stock returns during the crisis, risk (ES, Vol) and 
systemic risk (MES, Beta). 
 
This table contains overall  descriptive statistics (Panel  A)  and  sample correlation matrix  (Panel B)  for the following 
measures: (1) Realized SES: the stock return during July 2007 till December 2008. (2) ES: the Expected Shortfall of an 
individual stock at the 5
th-percentile. (3) MES is the marginal expected shortfalls of a stock given that the market return is 
below its 5
th-percentile. (4) Vol is the annualized daily individual stock return volatility. (5) Beta is the estimate of the 
coefficient in a regression of a firm’s stock return on that of the market’s. (6) Leverage(LVG) is measured as quasi-market 
value of assets divided by market value of equity, where quasi-market value of assets is book value of assets minus book 
value of equity + market value of equity. (7) Log-Assets is the natural logarithm of total book assets. (8) ME is the market 
value of equity. We used the value-weighted market return as provided by CRSP. ES, MES, Vol and Beta were measured for 
each individual company’s stock using the period June 2006 till June 2007. LVG, log-assets and ME are as of end of June 
2007. 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of the measures Realized SES, ES, MES, Vol, Beta, LVG, Log-Assets and ME. 
  Realized SES  ES  MES  Vol  Beta  LVG  Log-
Assets 
ME(blns)     
Average  -47%  2.73%  1.63%  21%  1.00  5.25  10.84  31.25     
Median  -46%  2.52%  1.47%  19%  0.89  4.54  10.88  15.85     
Std. dev.  34%  0.92%  0.62%  8%  0.37  4.40  1.78  42.88     
Min  -100%  1.27%  0.39%  10%  0.34  1.01  6.43  5.16     
Max  36%  5.82%  3.36%  49%  2.10  25.62  14.61  253.70     
                     
Panel B: Sample correlation matrix of the measures Realized SES, ES, MES, Vol, Beta, LVG, Log-Assets and ME. 
  Realized SES  ES  MES  Vol  Beta  LVG  Log-
Assets 
ME     
Realized SES  1.00                   
ES  -0.17  1.00                 
MES  -0.30  0.71  1.00               
Vol  -0.07  0.95  0.64  1.00             
Beta  -0.25  0.76  0.92  0.72  1.00           
LVG  -0.47  -0.09  0.24  -0.17  0.18  1.00         
Log-Assets  -0.38  -0.32  -0.07  -0.40  -0.07  0.75  1.00       
ME  -0.19  -0.24  -0.08  -0.25  -0.07  0.27  0.65  1.00     
                     
Panel C: Descriptive statistics of the measures Realized SES, ES, MES, Vol, Beta, LVG, Log-Assets and ME by institution type. 
  Realized SES  ES 
  Mean  Median  Std.  Min.  Max.  Mean  Median  Std.  Min.  Max. 
(1) Depositories  -1.73%  -2.21%  19.96%  -35.15%  37.27%  2.23%  2.11%  0.48%  1.27%  3.58% 
(2) Other   4.26%  -7.84%  35.94%  -46.21%  84.45%  3.35%  3.17%  1.06%  1.79%  5.82% 
(3) Insurance  -17.35%  -24.60%  30.25%  -68.76%  51.92%  2.44%  2.29%  0.69%  1.39%  4.42% 
(4) Broker-dealers  72.46%  82.62%  60.04%  3.35%  188.74%  3.61%  3.46%  0.68%  2.88%  5.24% 
                     
  MES  Vol 
  Mean  Median  Std.  Min.  Max.  Mean  Median  Std.  Min.  Max. 
(1) Depositories  1.42%  1.31%  0.34%  0.88%  2.12%  17%  16%  4%  10%  28% 
(2) Other   1.92%  1.83%  0.63%  0.92%  3.36%  26%  23%  9%  16%  49% 
(3) Insurance  1.28%  1.38%  0.39%  0.39%  2.09%  18%  17%  5%  11%  32% 
(4) Broker-dealers  2.68%  2.64%  0.34%  2.26%  3.29%  27%  26%  5%  21%  36% 
                     
  Beta  LVG 
  Mean  Median  Std.  Min.  Max.  Mean  Median  Std.  Min.  Max. 
(1) Depositories  0.87  0.82  0.19  0.53  1.33  6.21  6.26  1.80  1.34  9.25 
(2) Other   1.22  1.18  0.35  0.67  2.10  3.68  1.55  4.63  1.01  21.00 
(3) Insurance  0.78  0.76  0.23  0.34  1.51  4.44  3.07  3.29  1.29  11.85 
(4) Broker-dealers  1.61  1.60  0.24  1.21  1.96  9.58  9.25  8.26  1.03  25.62 
                     
 
 
 Table 4: Stock returns during the crisis, risk and systemic risk. 
 
This table contains the results of the cross-sectional regression analyses of individual company stock returns (Realized SES) on risk (ES, Vol, LVG) and systemic 
risk (MES, Beta) measures. Realized SES and risk measures are as described in Table 3. Leverage is measured as quasi-market value of assets divided by market 
value of equity, where quasi-market value of assets is book value of assets minus book value of equity + market value of equity.  All balance sheet data are based 
on quarterly CRSP-Compustat merged data as of end of June 2007. The industry type dummies are employed for Other, Insurance, and Broker-Dealers as 
classified in Appendix A. 
t-statistics are given in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. 
The dependent variable is Realized SES, the company stock returns during the crisis 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)   
ES  -0.05 
(-1.14) 
               
Vol    0.04 
(0.07) 
          -0.07 
(-0.12) 
 
MES      -0.21*** 
(-2.90) 
    -0.15** 
(-2.25) 
  -0.17** 
(-2.08) 
 
Beta        -0.29** 
(-2.24) 
         




  -0.03** 
(-2.29) 
 






                   




































































                   
Adj. R
2  0%  -1.36%  6.72%  3.62%  24.27%  27.34%  18.46%  28.02%   
No. Obs  102  102  102  102  102  102  102  102   Table 5: Stock returns during the crisis and systemic risk measured with different leads. 
 
This table contains the results of the cross-sectional regression analyses of individual company stock returns (Realized 
SES) on systemic risk: MES(Panel A), W-MES(Panel B), and D-MES(Panel C) measure. All measures are as described 
in Table 3 and Table 4, except for W-MES which is the value-weighted MES and D-MES which is the dynamic MES. 
MES and W-MES are measured over different pre-crisis periods as indicated below. The stock return during the crisis is 
always measured during July 2007 till December 2008. Leverage is based on data available at end of each period. Hence 
for columns 1 through 3 we use 2007Q1 data and for the last column we use 2006Q4 balance sheet data.  
 
t-statistics are given in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A (MES): The dependent variable is Realized SES, the company stock returns during the crisis 
  June06-May07  May06-Apr07  Apr06-Mar07  Mar06-Feb07 
























         
Adj. R
2  24.87%  21.84%  22.61%  21.00% 
No. Obs  102  102  102  102 
Panel B (W-MES): The dependent variable is Realized SES, the company stock returns during the crisis 
























         
Adj. R
2  23.15%  27.11%  27.76%  21.97% 
No. Obs  102  102  102  102 
Panel C (D-MES): The dependent variable is Realized SES, the company stock returns during the crisis 
Intercept  -0.12  
(-1.40)   
-0.06 
(-0.66  )    
-0.11  
(-1.24)    
-0.18* 
(-2.27)       
D-MES  -0.12* 
(-2.23)       
-0.13** 
(-2.86)    
-0.12* 
(-2.36)       
-0.08     
(-1.92)    
LVG  -0.03** 
(-5.25 )    
-0.03** 
(-4.82 )    
-0.03** 
(-4.13 )    
-0.03**     
(-5.02) 
         
Adj. R
2  24.14%  26.44%  24.58%  23.15% 
No. Obs  102  102  102  102  
Table 6: Summary statistics and correlation matrix of the MES measures of CDS and SES measures of CDS and stock 
 
This table contains overall descriptive statistics (Panel A) and sample correlation matrix (Panel B) for the following measures: (1)Stock return MES is the 
marginal expected shortfall of a stock given that the market return is below its 5
th-percentile; (2) CDS MES is the average return (change) in CDS spread 
over the days where the return (change) in the spread of the index of 40 firms are the widest; (3) CDS SES is the total realized return (change) in the 
spread over the crisis; (3) Stock realized SES is the stock return measured over the crisis periods. The sample consists of 40 firms whose CDS data are 
available from Bloomberg. 
 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of the MES measures of CDS and SES measures of CDS and stock 
 
  CDS (log returns) 
  CDS (arithmetic changes) in b.p 




(1 July 06- 
 30 June 07) 
Realized SES 
(1 July 06- 
 30 Dec 07) 
MES 
Realized SES 
(1 July 06-  
30 June 07) 
Realized SES 
(1 July 06- 
30 Dec 07) 
Realized SES 
(1 July 06- 
 30 June 07) 
Realized SES 
(1 July 06-  
30 Dec 2007) 
Average  3.46%  167.29%  218.04%  1.02  150.96  379.53  -37.48%  -57.71% 
Median  3.59%  166.91%  214.69%  0.57  64.64  187.05  -33.56%  -69.15% 
Std. dev.  3.21%  99.62%  116.37%  1.54  316.68  802.39  32.90%  35.17% 
Min  -0.63%  -119.93%  -103.25%  -0.25  3.00  -204.11  -98.43%  -99.82% 
Max  16.40%  424.10%  436.42%  6.84  1580.27  3550.28  32.88%  13.56% 
               
 
Panel B: Correlation matrix of the MES measures of CDS and SES measures of CDS and stock 
 
    CDS (log returns) 
  CDS (arithmetic changes) in b.p 
  Stock 
 
   
MES 
Realized SES 
(1 Jul 06- 
30 June 07) 
Realized SES 
(1 July 06- 
30 Dec 07) 
MES 
Realized SES 
(1 July 06- 
30 June 07) 
Realized SES 
(1 July 06- 
30 Dec 07) 
Realized SES 
(1 July 06- 
30 June 07) 
Realized SES 
(1 July 06- 





MES  1.00               
Realized SES 
(1 July 06- 30 June 07)  0.36  1.00             
Realized SES 






MES  0.52  -0.21  -0.23  1.00         
Realized SES 
(1 July 06- 30 June 07)  0.34  0.57  0.28  0.33  1.00       
Realized SES 
(1 July 06- 30 Dec 07)  0.60  0.40  0.64  0.28  0.45  1.00     
Stock 
Realized SES 
(1 July 06- 30 June 07)  -0.56  -0.62  -0.38  -0.23  -0.47  -0.42  1.00   
Realized SES 
(1 July 06- 30 Dec 07)  -0.50  -0.56  -0.50  -0.12  -0.30  -0.44  0.86  1.00 
 
  
Table 7: CDS MES vs. Realized CDS SES 
This table contains the results of the cross-sectional regression analyses of 40 companies’ realized CDS SES on CDS MES. 
Panel A provides the results where CDS MES and realized CDS SES are measured in log return. Panel B provides the 
results where CDS MES and realized CDS SES are measured using arithmetic changes in CDS spreads. All measures are as 
described in Table 3 and Table 4, except for CDS MES, which is the average CDS returns on the worst 5% days during 1 
July 2006-30 June 2007, where the average return on CDS spreads of the 40 companies are the highest. Leverage is based on 
data available at end of each period. 
 
t-statistics are given in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: The dependent variable is total realized return on CDS spread during the crisis, CDS MES is measured as log returns 
 
 
  1 July07-30 June 08  1 July07-14 Sep 08  1 July07-30 Sep 08  1 July07-10 Oct 8  1 July07-30 Dec 08 






























































           
Adj. R
2  17.86%  19.94%  19.37%  10.80%  19.30% 
No. Obs  40  40  40  40  40 
           
 


































































           
Adj. R
2  7.21%  5.13%  11.67%  14.09%  12.45% 
No. Obs  40  40  40  40  40 


















Table 8: CDS MES vs. Realized stock SES 
This table contains the results of the cross-sectional regression analyses of 40 companies’ realized stock returns (Realized 
SES) on CDS MES (measured as log returns in panel A and changes in CDS spreads in panel B). All measures are as 
described in Table 3 and Table 4, except for CDS MES, which is the average CDS returns on the worst 5% days during 1 
July 2006-30 June 2007, where the average changes in CDS spreads of the 40 companies are the highest. Leverage is based 
on data available at end of each period.  
 
t-statistics are given in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: The dependent variable is realized stock return during the crisis, CDS MES is measured as log returns 
 
 






























































           
Adj. R
2  46.79%  51.66%  50.94%  45.52%  40.76% 
No. Obs  40  40  40  40  40 
           
 
Panel B: The dependent variable is realized stock return during the crisis, CDS MES is measured as changes in CDS spreads 
 
 






























































           
Adj. R
2  37.16%  40.98%  37.31%  32.15%  28.49% 
No. Obs  40  40  40  40  40 























Figure 1: MES Vs. SCAP/Tier1Comm 
 
Scatterplot of the marginal expected shortfall measure, MES, against SCAP/Tier1comm. MES is the marginal expected shortfall of a stock given that the 
market return is below its 5














































Figure 2: MES Vs. Realized SES 
 
Scatterplot of the marginal expected shortfall measure, MES, against Realized SES, the return during the crisis. MES is the marginal expected 
shortfall of a stock given that the market return is below its 5
th-percentile. The sample consists of 102 US financial firms with a market cap in excess 
of 5 bln. dollars as of June 2007. MES5 was measured for each individual company stock using the period June 2006-June 2007. Realized SES, is the 
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MES5 measured June06 to June07Figure 3: LVG Vs. Realized SES 
 
Scatterplot of LVG, against Realized SES, the return during the crisis. LVG is the quasi market leverage. The sample consists of 101 US financial firms 
with a market cap in excess of 5 bln. dollars as of June 2007. LVG is as of June 2007. Realized SES, is the stock return during July 2007 till December 
2008. 
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Figure 4: Stability of MES. 
 
The graph depicts a scatter plot of the marginal expected shortfall measure at the 5% level (MES%) computed during the June 2006-June 2007 period versus 
that computed during June 2005-June2006. MES is the marginal expected shortfall of a stock given that the market return is below its 5
th-percentile.  
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Figure 5: CDS MES vs. Total realized return in CDS spread measured during the period 1 July 2007- 30 June 
2008 
The graph depicts a scatter plot of the CDS MES computed during the period 1 July 2006-30 June 2007 period versus the total realized return on CDS 
spread during 1 July 2007-30 June 2008. CDS MES is the average CDS returns on the worst 5% days during 1 July 2006-30 June 2007, where the average 
CDS returns of the 40 companies are the highest.  
 

























































































































Figure 6: CDS MES vs. Total realized return in CDS spread during the period 1 July 2007- 30 December 2008 
 
The graph depicts a scatter plot of the CDS MES computed during the period 1 July 2006-30 June 2007 period versus the total realized return on CDS 
spread during 1 July 2007-30 December 2008. CDS MES is the average CDS returns on the worst 5% days during 1 July 2006-30 June 2007, where the 
average CDS returns of the 40 companies are the highest.  
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CDS MES
  
Figure 7: CDS MES vs. Total realized stock return measured during the period 1 July 2007- 30 June 2008 
 
The graph depicts a scatter plot of the CDS MES computed during the 1 July 2006-30 June 2007 period versus the total realized stock return during 1 July 
2007-30 June 2008. CDS MES is the average CDS returns on the worst 5% days during 1 July 2006-30 June 2007, where the average CDS returns of the 40 
companies are the highest.  
 





































































































Figure 8: CDS MES vs. Total realized stock return measured during the period 1 July 2007- 30 December 
2008 
 
The graph depicts a scatter plot of the CDS MES computed during the 1 July 2006-30 June 2007 period versus the total realized stock return during 1 July 
2007-30 December 2008. CDS MES is the average CDS returns on the worst 5% days during 1 July 2006-30 June 2007, where the average CDS returns of 
the 40 companies are the highest.   
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 Appendix A 
 
This appendix contains the names of the U.S. financial institutions used in the analysis of the recent crisis. The institutions have been selected 
according to their inclusion in the U.S. financial sector and their market cap as of end of June 2007 where all firms had a market cap in excess of 
5bln USD.  
 
The companies can be categorized into the following four groups: Depositories(JPMorgan, Citigroup, WAMU,…), Broker-Dealers( Goldman 
Sachs, Morgan Stanley,…), Insurance( AIG, Berkshire Hathaway, Countrywide,…) and Insurance Agents, Brokers, Service(Metlife, Hartford 
Financial,…) and a group called others consisting of Non-depository Institutions, Real Estate etc.. 
 
The total number of firms in the sample is 102.  
 
Note that although Goldman Sachs has a SIC code of 6282 thus initially making it part of the group called Others we have nonetheless chosen to 
put in the group of Broker-Dealers. 
 
Depositories: 29 companies, 2-
digit SIC code=60. 
 
Other: Non-depository 
Institutions etc.: 27 Companies, 
2-digit SIC code=61, 62(except 
6211), 65, 67. 
Insurance: 36 
Companies, 2-digit SIC 
code=63 and 64. 
 
Broker-Dealers: 10 Companies, 
4-digit SIC code=6211. 
       
1.B B & T CORP 
2.BANK NEW YORK INC 
3.BANK OF AMERICA CORP 
4.CITIGROUP INC 
5.COMERICA INC 
6.COMMERCE BANCORP INC NJ 
7.HUDSON CITY BANCORP INC 
8.HUNTINGTON BANCSHARES INC 
9.JPMORGAN CHASE & CO 
10.KEYCORP NEW 
11.M & T BANK CORP 
12.MARSHALL & ILSLEY CORP 
13.NATIONAL CITY CORP 
14.NEW YORK COMMUNITY BANCORP 
INC 
15.NORTHERN TRUST CORP 
16.P N C FINANCIAL SERVICES GRP 
INC 
17.PEOPLES UNITED FINANCIAL INC 
18.REGIONS FINANCIAL CORP NEW 
19.SOVEREIGN BANCORP INC 
20.STATE STREET CORP 
21.SUNTRUST BANKS INC 
22.SYNOVUS FINANCIAL CORP 
23.U S BANCORP DEL 
24.UNIONBANCAL CORP 
25.WACHOVIA CORP 2ND NEW 
26.WASHINGTON MUTUAL INC 
27.WELLS FARGO & CO NEW 






3.AMERICAN EXPRESS CO 
4.AMERIPRISE FINANCIAL INC 
5.BLACKROCK INC 
6.C B O T HOLDINGS INC 
7.C B RICHARD ELLIS GROUP INC 
8.C I T GROUP INC NEW 
9.CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORP 
10.CHICAGO MERCANTILE EXCH 
HLDG INC 
11.COMPASS BANCSHARES INC 
12.EATON VANCE CORP 




15.FIDELITY NATIONAL INFO SVCS 
INC 
16.FIFTH THIRD BANCORP 
17.FRANKLIN RESOURCES INC 
18.INTERCONTINENTALEXCHANGE 
INC 
19.JANUS CAP GROUP INC 
20.LEGG MASON INC 
21.LEUCADIA NATIONAL CORP 
22.MASTERCARD INC 
23.N Y S E EURONEXT 
24.S E I INVESTMENTS COMPANY 
25.S L M CORP 
26.T D AMERITRADE HOLDING 
CORP 
27.UNION PACIFIC CORP 
 
1.A F L A C INC 














10.C I G N A CORP 













19.SVCS GROUP IN 






25.M B I A INC 








1.BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC 
2.E TRADE FINANCIAL CORP 
3.EDWARDS A G INC 
4.GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP INC 
5.LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS 
INC 
6.MERRILL LYNCH & CO INC 
7.MORGAN STANLEY DEAN WITTER 
& CO 
8.NYMEX HOLDINGS INC 
9.SCHWAB CHARLES CORP NEW 




























33.TRAVELERS COMPANIES INC 









 Appendix B: Systemic risk ranking of financial firms during June 2006 to June 2007 
 
This table contains the list of US financial firms with a market cap in excess of 5 bln. dollars as of June 2007. The firms are listed in descending 
order according to their Marginal Expected Shortfall at the 5% level (MES). Realized SES is the return during the crisis. Avg. $Loss of an 
individual firm is the average day-to-day loss in market cap. during days in which the market return was below its 5
th. Percentile. Avg. 
Contribution of an individual firm is the ratio of day-to-day loss in market cap. of an individual firm relative to that of all financial firms, 
averaged over days where the market was below its 5
th. percentile. LVG is the market leverage, Fitted Rank is the ranking of firms based on the 
fitted values of Realized SES as obtained by the regression given below, Log-Assets is the natural logarithm of total book assets and ME is 
market value of equity all as of June 2007. All data are from CRSP and CRSP merged Compustat. 
 
Realized SES= 0.02 - 0.15*MES - 0.04*LVG - 0.12*1[Other] - 0.01*1[Insurance] + 0.16*1[Broker-Dealers] 
 
MES 











(bln)  ME(bln) 
1.  INTERCONTINENTALEXCHANGE INC  -44.24%  3.36%  0.24  0.28%  1.12  16  2.55  10.40 
2.  E TRADE FINANCIAL CORP  -94.79%  3.29%  0.33  0.42%  7.24  21  62.98  9.39 
3.  BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC  -93.28%  3.15%  0.55  0.68%  25.62  1  423.30  16.66 
4.  N Y S E EURONEXT  -61.48%  3.05%  0.43  0.53%  1.43  19  16.93  19.44 
5.  C B RICHARD ELLIS GROUP INC  -88.16%  2.84%  0.20  0.25%  1.55  24  5.95  8.35 
6.  LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS INC  -99.82%  2.83%  1.08  1.26%  15.83  4  605.86  39.51 
7.  MORGAN STANLEY DEAN WITTER & CO  -76.21%  2.72%  2.09  2.51%  14.14  9  1199.99  88.40 
8.  AMERIPRISE FINANCIAL INC  -62.41%  2.68%  0.35  0.43%  7.72  7  108.13  14.95 
9.  GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP INC  -60.59%  2.64%  2.13  2.41%  11.25  15  943.20  88.54 
10.  MERRILL LYNCH & CO INC  -85.21%  2.64%  1.93  2.25%  15.32  5  1076.32  72.56 
11.  SCHWAB CHARLES CORP NEW  -15.95%  2.57%  0.59  0.66%  2.71  88  49.00  25.69 
12.  NYMEX HOLDINGS INC  -34.46%  2.47%  0.28  0.33%  1.23  98  3.53  11.57 
13.  C I T GROUP INC NEW  -91.08%  2.45%  0.26  0.32%  8.45  8  85.16  10.52 
14.  T D AMERITRADE HOLDING CORP  -28.75%  2.43%  0.24  0.30%  2.40  26  18.53  11.92 
15.  T ROWE PRICE GROUP INC  -29.83%  2.27%  0.27  0.32%  1.03  101  3.08  13.76 
16.  EDWARDS A G INC  -0.71%  2.26%  0.11  0.13%  1.46  100  5.24  6.43 
17.  FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSN  -98.78%  2.25%  1.24  1.51%  14.00  3  857.80  63.57 
18.  JANUS CAP GROUP INC  -71.12%  2.23%  0.09  0.10%  1.34  35  3.76  5.16 
19.  FRANKLIN RESOURCES INC  -51.23%  2.20%  0.62  0.66%  1.08  40  9.62  33.07 
20.  LEGG MASON INC  -76.98%  2.19%  0.29  0.30%  1.25  38  10.08  12.97 
21.  AMERICAN CAPITAL STRATEGIES LTD  -91.08%  2.15%  0.15  0.17%  1.73  32  12.15  7.75 
22.  STATE STREET CORP  -41.07%  2.12%  0.46  0.52%  5.54  28  112.27  23.01 
23.  WESTERN UNION CO  -30.84%  2.10%  0.36  0.42%  1.34  83  5.33  16.09 
24.  COUNTRYWIDE FINANCIAL CORP  -87.46%  2.09%  0.48  0.57%  10.39  6  216.82  21.57 
25.  EATON VANCE CORP  -51.20%  2.09%  0.09  0.10%  1.03  47  0.62  5.54 
26.  S E I INVESTMENTS COMPANY  -45.61%  2.00%  0.11  0.12%  1.08  50  1.12  5.69 
27.  BERKLEY W R CORP  -3.57%  1.95%  0.13  0.18%  3.07  31  16.63  6.32 
28.  SOVEREIGN BANCORP INC  -85.77%  1.95%  0.21  0.25%  8.34  20  82.74  10.11 
29.  JPMORGAN CHASE & CO  -31.48%  1.93%  3.19  3.60%  9.09  17  1458.04  165.51 
30.  BANK NEW YORK INC  -29.05%  1.90%  0.54  0.63%  4.64  48  126.33  31.43 
31.  M B I A INC  -93.34%  1.84%  0.16  0.20%  5.47  25  43.15  8.14 
32.  BLACKROCK INC  -12.07%  1.83%  0.23  0.25%  1.60  53  21.99  18.18 
33.  LEUCADIA NATIONAL CORP  -43.54%  1.80%  0.12  0.15%  1.28  61  6.38  7.63 
34.  WASHINGTON MUTUAL INC  -99.61%  1.80%  0.72  0.84%  8.67  23  312.22  37.63 
35.  NORTHERN TRUST CORP  -16.84%  1.75%  0.23  0.27%  4.92  52  59.61  14.14 
36.  C B O T HOLDINGS INC  10.12%  1.71%  0.13  0.15%  1.01  69  0.89  10.92 
37.  PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL GROUP INC  -59.75%  1.71%  0.27  0.29%  10.15  12  150.76  15.61 
38.  CITIGROUP INC  -85.86%  1.66%  4.19  4.87%  9.25  22  2220.87  253.70 
39.  LOEWS CORP  -44.08%  1.63%  0.39  0.50%  3.28  44  79.54  27.38 
40.  GENWORTH FINANCIAL INC  -91.43%  1.59%  0.25  0.28%  7.62  18  111.94  14.96 
41.  LINCOLN NATIONAL CORP IN  -72.08%  1.59%  0.29  0.32%  10.15  13  187.65  19.21 
42.  UNION PACIFIC CORP  -15.14%  1.58%  0.45  0.51%  1.70  65  37.30  31.03 
43.  AMERICAN EXPRESS CO  -69.00%  1.56%  1.08  1.27%  2.70  51  134.37  72.66 
44.  COMERICA INC  -63.00%  1.55%  0.16  0.18%  6.77  36  58.57  9.27 
45.  C I G N A CORP  -67.69%  1.54%  0.21  0.28%  3.50  46  41.53  15.03 46.  FIDELITY NATIONAL INFO SVCS INC  -27.15%  1.54%  0.14  0.15%  1.42  72  7.80  10.45 
47.  METLIFE INC  -44.06%  1.52%  0.71  0.82%  11.85  10  552.56  47.82 
48.  PROGRESSIVE CORP OH  -31.52%  1.51%  0.28  0.33%  1.89  73  21.07  17.42 
49.  M & T BANK CORP  -43.46%  1.49%  0.19  0.25%  5.47  60  57.87  11.57 
50.  NATIONAL CITY CORP  -94.28%  1.48%  0.34  0.37%  7.70  29  140.64  19.18 
51.  CHICAGO MERCANTILE EXCH HLDG INC  -59.88%  1.47%  0.27  0.29%  1.19  78  5.30  18.64 
52.  UNUM GROUP  -27.21%  1.46%  0.11  0.13%  5.99  27  52.07  8.95 
53.  HARTFORD FINANCIAL SVCS GROUP IN  -82.02%  1.46%  0.45  0.50%  11.48  11  345.65  31.19 
54.  AMBAC FINANCIAL GROUP INC  -98.47%  1.45%  0.13  0.18%  2.69  64  21.06  8.89 
55.  AETNA INC NEW  -42.17%  1.45%  0.34  0.43%  2.58  66  49.57  25.31 
56.  LOEWS CORP  -4.54%  1.44%  0.10  0.12%  1.29  82  2.84  8.38 
57.  BANK OF AMERICA CORP  -68.05%  1.44%  3.27  3.54%  7.46  33  1534.36  216.96 
58.  PRUDENTIAL FINANCIAL INC  -67.16%  1.43%  0.60  0.73%  10.75  14  461.81  45.02 
59.  SAFECO CORP  13.56%  1.42%  0.10  0.12%  2.51  68  13.97  6.61 
60.  HUMANA INC  -38.79%  1.40%  0.14  0.17%  1.97  76  13.33  10.24 
61.  FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE CORP  -98.75%  1.36%  0.60  0.74%  21.00  2  821.67  40.16 
62.  CHUBB CORP  -2.24%  1.36%  0.30  0.35%  2.74  67  51.73  21.74 
63.  WELLS FARGO & CO NEW  -10.88%  1.34%  1.58  1.50%  5.19  71  539.87  117.46 
64.  KEYCORP NEW  -73.09%  1.31%  0.20  0.23%  7.41  41  94.08  13.47 
65.  WACHOVIA CORP 2ND NEW  -88.34%  1.31%  1.32  1.40%  7.64  37  719.92  98.06 
66.  B B & T CORP  -26.22%  1.30%  0.30  0.33%  6.23  59  127.58  22.07 
67.  FIFTH THIRD BANCORP  -77.61%  1.29%  0.29  0.32%  5.33  30  101.39  21.30 
68.  CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORP  -57.90%  1.28%  0.38  0.47%  4.70  39  145.94  32.60 
69.  REGIONS FINANCIAL CORP NEW  -73.55%  1.27%  0.30  0.29%  6.06  63  137.62  23.33 
70.  HUNTINGTON BANCSHARES INC  -62.50%  1.27%  0.07  0.08%  7.23  45  36.42  5.35 
71.  MASTERCARD INC  -13.49%  1.27%  0.13  0.14%  1.21  85  5.61  13.23 
72.  TRAVELERS COMPANIES INC  -12.32%  1.26%  0.45  0.51%  3.54  62  115.36  35.52 
73.  COMMERCE BANCORP INC NJ  -4.42%  1.26%  0.08  0.10%  7.40  43  48.18  7.08 
74.  HUDSON CITY BANCORP INC  35.63%  1.26%  0.10  0.09%  6.39  58  39.69  6.50 
75.  P N C FINANCIAL SERVICES GRP INC  -27.35%  1.24%  0.28  0.29%  5.50  74  125.65  24.69 
76.  C N A FINANCIAL CORP  -64.73%  1.22%  0.14  0.16%  4.92  42  60.74  12.95 
77.  UNIONBANCAL CORP  29.14%  1.22%  0.11  0.11%  6.88  54  53.17  8.25 
78.  AON CORP  9.48%  1.20%  0.14  0.15%  2.55  80  24.79  12.51 
79.  MARSHALL & ILSLEY CORP  -60.34%  1.20%  0.15  0.16%  5.20  79  58.30  12.34 
80.  ASSURANT INC  -47.98%  1.18%  0.08  0.10%  4.08  57  25.77  7.13 
81.  CINCINNATI FINANCIAL CORP  -28.29%  1.17%  0.10  0.12%  2.53  81  18.26  7.46 
82.  PEOPLES UNITED FINANCIAL INC  5.77%  1.16%  0.07  0.06%  2.75  96  13.82  5.33 
83.  COMPASS BANCSHARES INC  -6.70%  1.16%  0.11  0.12%  4.48  49  34.88  9.17 
84.  TORCHMARK CORP  -32.18%  1.15%  0.07  0.09%  2.85  77  15.10  6.40 
85.  SYNOVUS FINANCIAL CORP  -36.53%  1.12%  0.11  0.13%  3.92  90  33.22  10.04 
86.  ALLSTATE CORP  -43.63%  1.10%  0.40  0.49%  4.72  55  160.54  37.36 
87.  FIDELITY NATIONAL FINL INC NEW  -16.80%  1.09%  0.04  0.04%  1.73  87  7.37  5.25 
88.  ALLTEL CORP  5.98%  1.08%  0.25  0.29%  1.25  89  17.44  23.23 
89.  SUNTRUST BANKS INC  -62.60%  1.08%  0.34  0.33%  6.35  70  180.31  30.58 
90.  HEALTH NET INC  -79.37%  1.04%  0.06  0.08%  1.47  91  4.73  5.93 
91.  ZIONS BANCORP  -66.42%  1.02%  0.09  0.10%  6.26  75  48.69  8.31 
92.  COVENTRY HEALTH CARE INC  -74.19%  0.99%  0.09  0.11%  1.39  94  6.41  9.01 
93.  MARSH & MCLENNAN COS INC  -17.94%  0.92%  0.16  0.16%  1.67  93  17.19  17.15 
94.  S L M CORP  -84.54%  0.92%  0.18  0.23%  6.40  34  132.80  23.69 
95.  NEW YORK COMMUNITY BANCORP INC  -23.11%  0.92%  0.05  0.05%  5.81  84  29.62  5.33 
96.  WELLPOINT INC  -47.23%  0.88%  0.43  0.50%  1.60  95  54.19  48.99 
97.  U S BANCORP DEL  -17.56%  0.88%  0.53  0.54%  4.55  92  222.53  57.29 
98.  A F L A C INC  -8.52%  0.85%  0.21  0.16%  3.07  86  60.11  25.14 
99.  UNITEDHEALTH GROUP INC  -47.94%  0.72%  0.49  0.45%  1.47  97  53.15  68.53 
100.  AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP INC  -97.70%  0.71%  1.22  1.03%  6.12  56  1033.87  181.67 
101.  BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC DEL(A)  -11.76%  0.41%  0.49  0.53%  2.29  99  269.05  119.00 
102.  BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC DEL(B)  -10.85%  0.39%            49.29 Appendix C: CDS MES ranking of financial firms during June 2006 to June 2007 
 
This table contains the list of 40 US financial firms with a market cap in excess of 5 bln. dollars as of June 2007. The firms are 
listed in descending order according to their CDS Marginal Expected Shortfall at the 5% level (MES). Realized SES is the 
return on CDS spread during the crisis.  
 















GENWORTH FINANCIAL INC  Insurance  1  145.38%  403.03%  16.40% 
AMBAC FINANCIAL GROUP INC  Insurance  2  424.10%  389.12%  8.05% 
WACHOVIA CORP 2ND NEW  Depository  3  266.11%  219.94%  7.21% 
S L M CORP  Other  4  48.88%  113.08%  6.82% 
CITIGROUP INC  Depository  5  243.16%  278.96%  6.80% 
C I T GROUP INC NEW  Other  6  243.16%  278.96%  6.80% 
M B I A INC  Insurance  7  383.11%  303.44%  6.71% 
MERRILL LYNCH & CO INC  Broker-Dealer  8  200.27%  160.20%  6.37% 
WASHINGTON MUTUAL INC  Depository  9  261.19%  436.42%  6.15% 
WELLS FARGO & CO NEW  Depository  10  227.79%  233.43%  6.00% 
FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSN  Other  11  194.89%  78.69%  5.70% 
LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS INC  Broker-Dealer  12  199.25%  282.25%  5.44% 
BANK OF AMERICA CORP  Depository  13  207.86%  215.70%  5.23% 
MORGAN STANLEY DEAN WITTER & CO  Broker-Dealer  14  166.88%  248.96%  4.86% 
ALLTEL CORP  Other  15  -119.93%  -103.25%  4.80% 
AMERICAN EXPRESS CO  Other  16  237.53%  293.40%  4.36% 
FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE CORP  Other  17  210.58%  94.57%  4.20% 
BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC  Broker-Dealer  18  68.72%  84.96%  4.18% 
GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP INC  Broker-Dealer  19  135.50%  213.68%  3.87% 
UNION PACIFIC CORP  Other  20  86.69%  123.56%  3.69% 
JPMORGAN CHASE & CO  Depository  21  166.95%  182.80%  3.49% 
AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP INC  Insurance  22  277.42%  369.20%  3.40% 
ALLSTATE CORP  Insurance  23  183.66%  271.38%  2.97% 
LOEWS CORP1  Insurance  24  136.79%  175.47%  2.67% 
PRUDENTIAL FINANCIAL INC  Insurance  25  240.25%  394.44%  2.33% 
LINCOLN NATIONAL CORP IN  Insurance  26  234.94%  403.58%  2.27% 
AON CORP  Insurance  27  32.41%  55.10%  2.26% 
HARTFORD FINANCIAL SVCS GROUP IN  Insurance  28  212.09%  368.41%  2.03% 
TRAVELERS COMPANIES INC  Insurance  29  124.68%  171.62%  1.95% 
CHUBB CORP  Insurance  30  164.91%  192.52%  1.73% 
UNUM GROUP  Insurance  31  118.33%  165.43%  0.98% 
SAFECO CORP  Insurance  32  123.95%  155.92%  0.85% 
C N A FINANCIAL CORP  Insurance  33  105.34%  218.89%  0.84% 
METLIFE INC  Insurance  34  220.59%  362.62%  0.75% 
TORCHMARK CORP  Insurance  35  24.69%  182.45%  0.34% 
JANUS CAP GROUP INC  Broker-Dealer  36  38.36%  202.27%  0.00% 
SCHWAB CHARLES CORP NEW  Other  37  149.45%  191.31%  0.00% 
AETNA INC NEW  Insurance  38  127.42%  192.96%  -0.12% 
C I G N A CORP  Insurance  39  124.73%  267.69%  -0.56% 
MARSH & MCLENNAN COS INC  Insurance  40  31.82%  33.43%  -0.63% 
 